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NOTES
DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS IN STATE
ELECTIONS: BLUMSTEIN v. ELLINGTON
On June 12, 1970, James F. Blumstein' established his home in
Nashville, Tennessee, with the intention of remaining in the community
indefinitely. On July 1, 1970, he attempted to register to vote in Davidson
County and was refused. He was informed that in order to qualify for
registration he must have been a resident of Davidson County for the
three-month period preceding the forthcoming election, to be held
August 6, 1970, and a resident of the State of Tennessee for the oneyear period preceeding that election.2 After exhausting his state
remedies' and failing in his efforts to obtain extraordinary relief,"
Blumstein brought a declaratory judgment action in his own behalf and
on behalf of all others similarly situated' before a three-judge district
court.' On August 31, 1970, the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee struck down the Tennessee durational
residency requirement for voting in a state election as a violation of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The practical effect of this decision, if upheld, could be enormous.
Every state currently has a durational residency requirement varying
1. -F. Supp.-(M.D. Tenn. Aug. 31, 1970) (Hereinafter cited as Blumstein). Since
Blumstein, four other states have passed on the question of residency requirements. A

three-judge United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia invalidated
Virginia's one-year residency requirement. Bufford v. Holton, 39 U.S.L.W. 2253 (E.D.
Va. Oct. 27, 1970). On October 7, 1970, the Court of Appeals of California overturned
that state's one-year residency requirement. Keane v. Mihaly, 90 Cal. Rptr. 263,-P.2d(1970). On October 26, the Vermont one-year residency requirement was nullified. Kohn
v. Davis, 39 U.S.L.W. 2253 (D. Vt. Oct. 26, 1970). However, a three-judge United
States District Court, convened in Arizona, upheld a one-year residency requirement in
that state. Cocanower v. Marston, -F. Supp. -(D. Ariz. Sept. 21, 1970). Since the
legal issues raised in these three cases are identical to those considered in Blumstein,
the cases will be treated as one.
2. Tenn. Const. art. IV, § 1; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 2-201, -304 (1956).
3. Appeal to Davidson County Election Commission pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann.
2-319 (1956).
4. A temporary injunction permitting Blumstein and all others similarly situated
to register was denied as too disruptive of the election process. A second motion seeking
to allow Blumstein to file a sealed provisional ballot with the clerk of the court pending
the outcome of his action was denied on the same ground.
5. See Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1964).
6. See Declaratory Judgment Act 28 U.S.C. §2281 (1964), which requires a
three judge court to be convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1964).
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from a high of two years in Mississippi7 to a low of ninety days in
Pennsylvania8 and three months in New York.' In addition, 42 states
require residence in the county for periods ranging from six months to
30 days, and 36 states require residence in the precinct for periods ranging
from one year in Mississippi to ten days in Iowa, Nebraska, Nevada,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming."0 All three requirements are potential sources
7. Miss. Code Ann. § 3235 (1942).
8. Penn. Const. art. VII, § 1.
9. N.Y. Const. art. II, § 1.
10.
Minimum Length of Residency Requirements
for 1968 General Elections by State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

State

County

Precinct

1 year
1 year
1 year
1 year
1 year
1 year
6 months
1 year

6 months
none
30 days
6 months
90 days
90 days
6 months in town
3 months

3 months
30 days
30 days
30 days
54 days
20 days
none
30 days

1 year
1 year
1 year
1 year
6 months
1 year
6 months
6 months
6 months
1 year
1 year
6 months
1 year
1 year
6 months
6 months
2 years
1 year
1 year
6 months
6 months
6 months
6 months
1 year
3 months
1 year
1 year
1 year
6 months
6 months
90 days
1 year

none
6 months
6 months
3 months
30 days
90 days
60 days in township
60 days
none
6 months
6 months
3 months in city
6 months
none
30 days in city
none
none
60 days
30 days
40 days
30 days
6 months in town
40 days
90 days
3 months
none
90 days
40 days
2 months
30 days
none
6 months in city

none
45 days
none
3 months
none
30 days
30 days
10 days
30 days
60 days
3 months
none
6 months
6 months
none
30 days
1 year
none
none
10 days
10 days
none
none
30 days
3 months
30 days
30 days
40 days
20 days
30 days
60 days in district
none
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of disenfranchisement for movers.
Combining the pervasiveness of durational residency requirements
and the mobility of our population results in a loss of voting rights for a
major segment of our population. The Census Bureau estimates that
approximately one-sixth of our people move their residence from one
state to another every decade." As a result, it has been estimated that
residency requirements disenfranchised five million citizens in 1954,12
between five and eight million in 1960," almost fifteen million in 1964,14
and another five to eight million in 1968."5 In Indiana, approximately
13,900 persons are disenfranchised every election for failure to comply
with the sixty-day township residency requirement because of an intercounty, intrastate move. 6 Coupled with the loss of rights suffered by
those moving into the state and unable to comply with the six-month state
residency requirement, this creates a loss of potential voters significant
enough to cause an impact on election results. Moreover, the class of
people who move are, "as a single gross category . . . men who tend to
be somewhat better educated and who have considerably better jobs and
higher incomes than the natives of the region they leave" ;17 the class of
1 year
1 year
1 year
1 year
1 year
1 year
1 year
1 year
1 year
6 months
1 year

South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

6 months
90 days
3 months
6 months
4 months
90 days in town
6 -months
90 days
60 days
none
60 days

3 months
30 days
none
none
60 days
none
30 days
30 days
none
10 days
10 days

U.S. SENATE, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
AND VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 252-59 (1968).

11.
12.

See 115 CONG. REC. 551-78 (1969).
Goldman, Move-Lose Your Vote, 45 NATL. MUN. REV. 61 (1956).

13.

REPORT

OF

THE

PRESIDENTS

COMMISSION

ON

REGISTRATION

AND

VOTING

PATnCIPATION 13 (1963). See also Note, Elections-Qualificationof Voting-Residency
Requirements Reduced for Voting in PresidentialElections-Uniform Act for Voting by
New Residents in PresidentialElections, 77 HARV. L. REV. 574 (1964).
14. Hearings on S. 596, S. 546, S. 188 and S. 1881 Before the Subconm.
on Privileges and Elections of the Senate Comm. on Rules and Administration, 90th
CONG., 1st SESS. 21 (1967).
15. See Gallop Poll of December 11, 1968 estimating 5 million; Library of Congress estimating 5 to 8 million (115 CONG. REc. S. 2113 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1969));
Bureau of Census estimating 5.5 million (115 CONG. REc. H. 12156 (daily ed. Feb. 28,
1969)).
16. Note, The Impact and Constitutionality of Voter Residence Requirements as
Applied to Certain IntrastateMovers, 43 IND. L.J. 901, 903 (1969).
17. A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER, D. STOKES, THE AMERICAN VOTER:
AN ABRIDGEMENT 233 (1964).
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people who are most likely to vote if given the opportunity." Consider
the possible effect of the disenfranchisement of five million potential
voters on an election such as the 1960 presidential election, when John
Kennedy defeated Richard Nixon by barely 100,000 votes (34,226,925
to 34,108,662)."
While the 1970 Voting Rights Act has taken
presidential elections out of the control of state durational residency
requirements,2" the problem still exists on a state level. The 1970
Indiana General Election is a prime example of the potential effect on a
non-presidential level. The race for the United States Senate was decided
by only 4,383 votes, while other state offices were won or lost by margins
as low as 7,416 and 476.21 When you consider that almost 14,000
citizens lost the right to vote from intrastate movement alone, the
sig-nificance of the durational residency requirements on elections such
as this one is made clear.
Apart from the possible result-altering effect on elections, disenfranchisement may also create less tangible, but no less serious harms
in its permanent effect on the individual whose rights have been denied:
Apart from the possible effects upon election results, [these
archaic residency requirements] produce apathy and bitterness
in such people [disenfranchised voters] toward governments
which cheat them of their democratic birthright merely because
they move their residence. 2
While the Blumstein decision has potential effects of great significance, it is nonetheless a surprise that it was decided at all. In two cases
decided in 1969, the United States Supreme Court dismissed attacks on
state election laws for mootness.2" In both, as in Blumstein, the election
had been held by the time of trial and the plaintiffs would have satisfied
the requirements prior to the next election. Since standing to challenge
the relatively short county residency requirements would not mature
until a person moved into the county within three months of an election,
only extraordinary judicial expedients would permit a plaintiff to exhaust
state remedies and complete a law suit prior to the election.24 On the
18. See generally N. PIERCE,
PoLITIcAL LIFE (1959).
19. 1961 WORLD ALMANAC 240.

THE PEOPLES PRESIDENT

(1968);

R.

LANE,

20. Pub. L. 91-285, § 202(c) (June 22, 1970) (Voting Rights Amendments
of 1970), ammeding, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971 (Supp. V 1965-69).
21.
22.

Vote totals as certified by Secretary of State subject to possible recount.
S. REP. No. 80, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1963).

23. See Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969); Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S.

41 (1969).
24. 396 U.S. at 50.
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surface it appeared as if county durational residency requirements were
immune from review.
Even if the issue could reach a decision on the merits, as recently
as 1965 the Supreme Court in Drueding v. Devlin25 had affirmed a
state's durational residency requirement substanially identical to Tennessee's on the ground that such requirements are permissible unless
they are "so unreasonable that they amount to an irrational or unreasonable discrimination."2 6 Such a presumption of validity would be extremely
difficult for an aggrieved plaintiff to overcome. Nevertheless, the Blumstein case was heard and decided for plaintiff on the merits. The following
analysis explores both the process and the validity of that decision.
I.

THE MOOTNESS ISSUE

The court dismisses Hall v. Beals27 as inapplicable on the issue of
mootness. While the Hall court noted that the election was over and
plaintiffs would fulfill the residency requirement by the next election, it
stated that its mootness holding was apart from these considerations.
What the court found determinative in its mootness holding was the fact
that the Colorado statute under attack had been amended prior to the
action such that the plaintiff would have been permitted to vote in the
previous election. Since the offending statute no longer existed, a decision
voiding it would have no effect. The mootness doctrine is merely the
courts' self-imposed restraint against wasting its time rendering decisions
on controversies already resolved. The amendment resolved the controversy before the court by reducing the length of the residency requirement so that plaintiff would not have been affected by it. Moreover, since
he had never been a member of the class affected by the new statute, he
had no standing to challenge it. Since plaintiff's controversy over the
original statute had been settled by the amendment and he lacked standing
to challenge the new statute, the Hall court properly refused to consider
the case further.
In Brockington v. Rhodes, 8 the statute had also been amended,
but here the plaintiff was still a member of the class denied the right to
vote under the amended statute. The Supreme Court refused to find
mootness either in the statutory amendment or the subsequent election
but based its holding of mootness on the ground that plaintiff "sought
only a writ of mandamus to compel the appellees to place his name on the
25. 380
[Hereinafter
26. 234
27. 396
28. 396

U.S. 125 (1965), afj'd per curiam, 234 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964)
cited as Drueding].
F. Supp. at 725.
U.S. 45 [Hereinafter cited as Hall].
U.S. 41 [Hereinafter cited as Brockington].
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ballot as a candidate for a particular office in a particular election.... 29
Such relief was plainly impossible. Since the statute in Blumstein had
not been amended, plaintiff was still agrieved by the statute and had
requested appropriate and available relief in terms of a declaratory
judgment in a class action. There is language in Brockington that
indicates that the result may have been different had plaintiff there done
likewise:
He did not sue for himself and others similarly situated as
independent voters, as he might have . . . [and]

[h]e did

not seek a declaratory judgment, although that avenue too
was open to him."0
This language, coupled with the negative implication of the refusal of
either court to hold the passing of the election as dispository, would
seem to indicate that the Supreme Court is ready to hear a case such as
Blumstein on the merits.
The loophole in the mootness doctrine which permitted Hall, Brockington, and now Blumstein to get beyond the passing of the election was
first put forth in 1911 in Southern Pacific Terminal Company v.
Interstate Commerce Commission."' The case concerned a short term
cease and desist order from the Interstate Commerce Commission which
expired before the action could be heard: "The questions involved are
usually continuing . .. and their consideration ought not to be, as they
might be, defeated by short term orders, capable of repetition yet evading
review.... 2)32
It is the repetitive nature of the offense that escapes the mootness
doctrine purpose of avoiding academic decisions. Election cases seem
particularly susceptable to the abuse. Since standing to challenge an election law does not arise until a person is refused his right to register
shortly before an election, a holding that the passing of the election
renders the case moot would constrict the time available for challenge too
tightly to permit judicial review. Yet, the same problem would be
certain to re-occur with every election. Because of the certainty of
repetition and difficulty of review, a decision on the merits, despite the
passing of the election immediately involved, would not be merely an
academic decision of an already settled controversy. The doctrine was
applied in Gray v. Sanders,3 an election case decided in 1963. The court
29. Id. at 43.
30. Id.
31 219U.S.498 (1911).
32. Id. at 515 (emphasis added).

33. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
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there ruled that completion of the election did not make the case moot
when the challenged "[a]ct remains in force, and if the complaint were
dismissed it would govern future elections.""4
In 1969 the Supreme Court decision in Moore v. Ogilvie" removed
all doubt that the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to
the mootness doctrine applies to cases alleging deprivation of election
rights:
While the 1968 election is over, the burden . . . allowed
to be placed . . . remains and controls future elections . . . The

problem is therefore "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
. . . The need for its resolution thus reflects a continuing controversy.

II.

36

THE MERITS

Durational residency requirements established two classes of citizens,
movers and non-movers, which became a basis for determining the
availability of the ballot. This classification would be offensive to the
fourteenth amendment concept of equal protection if the state could not
justify the distinction. The first crucial question on the merits the
Blumstein court had to meet was the establishment of the proper standard
by which to evaluate the justification for the Tennessee requirements.
The traditional standard utilized when state statutes were challenged on
equal protection grounds was reaffirmed in Drueding, a case upholding
a state durational law; the state, in order to prevail, need only show that
a classification is reasonably related to the governmental objective involved." A typical statement of the standard requires that state classifications be "utterly lacking in rational justification"3 8 before they will
34. Id. at 376.
35. 394U.S. 814 (1969).
36. Id. at 816.
37. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961); Flemming v
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 604 (1960) ; Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959) ;

Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs., 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947); Linley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
38. "[T]he Due Process Clause can be thought to interpose a bar only if the
statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification." Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1959). Another extreme example of the
standard is illustrated by the following:
a state statute may not be struck down as offensive of equal protection in its
schemes of classifications unless it is obviouly arbitrary, and that, except
in the case of statutes whose discriminations are so patently without reason
that no conceivable situation of fact could be found to justify them, the claimant
who challenges the statute bears the burden of affirmative demonstration that
in the actual state of facts which surround its operation, its classifications
lack rationality.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 535 (1961).
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be found in violation of the equal protection clause.
Exceptiow to the Drueding Standard
In 1965, the time of the Drueding decision, there were two lines
of cases developing exceptions to this standard which would cast doubt
on the Drueding holding. The first of these exceptions imposed a
higher standard of justification before a state could make a classification
abridging fundamental rights. This standard was imposed as early as
1941 to strike down an Oklahoma statute providing for involuntary
sterilization of certain classes of criminal offenders."9 This standard was
given its present formulation in the civil rights cases of the late 1950's.4"
By 1963 the exception was firmly entrenched that no fundamental right
could be abridged without a state showing of a compelling interest."'
In those matters classed as fundamental, the "rational relation" test was
dead. All that remained was the classification of voting as one of those
fundamental rights entitled to the protection of the compelling state
interest test.
The second line of cases established the necessity for the stricter
compelling state interest test in those cases where classifications are based
on "suspect criteria." The first criterion to be so classified was race.
The Japanese resettlement cases of World War II first produced this
stricter standard:
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are
unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to
the most rigid scrutiny. 2
39. We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic
civir rights of man . . . strict scrutinizing of the classification which a State
makes . . . is essential, lest unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious discriminations
are made against groups or types of individuals in violation of the constitutional
guarantee of just and equal laws.
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1941).
40. "Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State
may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling." Bates v.
Litle Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1959). In NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
the Court stated: ". . . to justify the deterrent effect . . on the free exercise . . . of
their constitutionally protected right . . . a . . . subordinating interest of the state must

be compelling." Id. at 463.
41. It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some
colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional
area only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion
for permissible limitation.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
42. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1943).
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The suspect nature of classifications based on race was well established
by 1964,"3 and a new category, religion, was added to the list."' Soon
wealth " and political beliefs46 would join race47 as suspect criteria. The
single step remaining was to find a classification based on movement of
residence to be suspect.
Exceptions Extending to Voting and Residency
By the time Drueding was decided, two cases had already cast doubt
on its holding by finding voting to be a fundamental right requiring the
compelling state interest test. 4 Both were decided less that a year before
Drueding. It is difficult to reconcile the strong commitment of Reynolds,
applying the compelling state interest test, and the application of the
lesser standard in Drueding less than a year later. The difference in
facts-Reynolds was concerned with the dilution of votes through a
failure to reapportion, while Drueding, like Blumstein, concerned the
denial of the right to vote through durational residency requirementdoes not seem to account for the difference in theory.
A United States District Court, in dicta, upheld the Drueding
standard by suggesting an immediacy of need standard for determining
what is a fundamental right:
But certainly it takes little logic to conclude that the need
for food, clothing and shelter has an aspect of immediacy which
differentiates it in kind from the right to vote."
This distinction has not been adopted, and more recent Supreme Court
43.

See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954);

Oyama v. California, 332

U.S. 633, 640 (1948) ; Korematsu v. United Sates, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ; Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83 100 (1943).
44. See Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961).
45. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
46. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).
47. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
48. In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), the Court noted:
No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the
election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live.
Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.
Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a way that
unnecessarily abridges this right.
Id. at 17-18. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), it stated:
Undoubtedly the right of sufferage is a fundamental matter in a free and
democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a
free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political
rights, any alleged infringement of the right of its citizens to vote must be
carefully and meticulously scrutinized.
Id. a 562.
49. Green v. Dept. Pub. Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173, 178 (D. Del. 1967).
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opinions indicate that the Reynolds standard has been affirmed.5" As
the Blumstein court pointed out, any doubts of the proper standard to
5 ' decision handed
be applied were put to rest by the Evans v. Cornan
down on June 15, 1970:
Moreover, the right to vote, as the citizen's link to his laws and
government, is protective of all fundamental rights and privileges ....

And before that right can be restricted, the purpose

of the restrictions and the asserted overriding interests served
by it must meet close constitutional scrutinizing.5 2
Consequently, the fundamental nature of the voting privilege appears to
call for the adoption of the compelling state interest standard.
The second line of cases developing the suspect criteria rationale for
requiring a compelling state interest standard were merged with a long
line of cases supporting the right to travel 8 in Shapiro v. Thompson.5'
Shapiro added interstate travel to the list of suspect criteria for classification as they held durational residency requirements for welfare unconstitutional.5 5 While the court in Shapiro specifically left open the
application of its holding to voter residency requirements, 6 a threejudge District Court in Massachusetts adopted the Shapiro rationale to
50. In Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969), a bachelor who
lived with his parents and owned no property was denied the right to vote in a school
district election. The cour held,
* * . if a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to some bona fide
residents of requisite age and citizenship and denied the franchise to others,
the court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a
compelling state interest.
Id. at 627.
51. 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
52. Id. at 422.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
54. 394 U.S. 618 (1969) [Hereinafter cited as Shapiro].
55. Id. at 634:
At the outset, we reject appellants' argument that a mere showing of a
rational relationship between the waiting period and . . . permissible state
objectives will suffice to justify the classification. The waiting period provision
denies welfare benefits to otherwise eligible applicants solely because they have
recently moved into the jurisdiction. But in moving from state to state or to the
District of Columbia appellees were exercising a constitutional right and any
classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right unless shown
to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest is unconstitutional.
56. Id. at 638 n. 21:
We imply no view of the validity of the waiting period or residence requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free education,
to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth. Such
requirements may promote compelling state interests on the one hand, or, on the
other, may not be penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional right of
interstate travel.
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void Massachusetts' one-year residency requirements in the state, although
it did not have before it the additional six-month residency requirement
in the precinct:
This court finds no basis for any compelling state interest
to be served by singling out interstate movers as a class of
persons for whom an additional six months residency is
mandatory. 7
It appears that the use of the suspect criterion of movement to deny
the franchise requires the showing of a compelling state interest. Under
either analysis, the abridgement of fundamental rights or the suspect
criteria, the Blumstein court correctly reached the conclusion that the
standard against which the state's justification must be measured is that
of a compelling state interest.5"
The State Interest
Having determined the standard the justifications for durational
residency requirements must meet to be compatable with the equal protection clause, examination of the interests of the state is now appropriate. Two major justifications have been put forth to support durational
residency requirements. The first is to promote a more intelligent vote
by insuring that voters have an opportunity to become familiar with
local issues. The second is the prevention of fraud. 9 While Blwmrstein
only dealt with the latter, the former deserves discussion as well.
The argument with respect to promotion of a more intelligent vote
was raised and dismissed in the context of presidential elections before
a three-judge federal court for the District of Columbia in a case challeng57. Burg v. Canniffe, 315 F. Supp. 380 (D. Mass. 1970).
58. It is on this point that the Arizona court, which upheld durational residency
requirements, disagreed. The court applied the lesser standard of Drueding, nothing that
the cases upholding the stricter standard involved special elections and that the right
here involved was only temporarily lost. Cocanower v. Marston,- F. Supp.- (D. Ariz.
Sept. 21, 1970). It would seem, however, that there would be even more reason for
applying a strict standard in cases involving general elections than in the relatively
unimportant school district and bond issue cases. The distinction does not seem to
support the Arizona result. As for the second distinction, it would be extremely unfortunate if the Supreme Court were to uphold the deprivation of a right it has termed
fundamental to all of our rights on the ground that it is only to be denied for six months
to two years.
59. See, e.g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Lassiter v. Northampton
County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) ; Hall v. Beals, 292 F. Supp 610 (D. Colo.
1968) vacated as inoot, 396 U.S. 45 (1969) ; Sola v. Sanchez Vilella, 270 F. Supp. 459
(D.P.R. 1967), af'd., 390 F.2d 160 (1st Cir. 1968); Drueding v. Devlin, 234 F. Supp.
721 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd. per curiam, 380 U.S. 125 (1965); Howard v. Skinner, 87 Md.

556, 40 A. 379 (1898).
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ing the constitutionality of the 1970 Voting Rights Act." The court
found the gain in knowledge of local issues inconsequential when compared to the loss of the right to vote."' Although the state's interest is
undoubtedly greater in seeking to insure knowledge of local issues before
permitting one to vote in a local election, there are reasons to believe that
no compelling state interest can be shown. First is the fact that durational
residency requirements are unnecessary to accomplish the goal. Given
modern campaign techniques involving public relations men, frequent
television and radio appearances, and saturation press coverage, it is difficult to imagine a newcomer requiring a year to inform himself of the
issues of the campaign and the facts relevant to them. Indeed, it is
difficult to imagine a concerned voter unable to fully inform himself as
to enough of the local issues and affairs to cast an intelligent vote in a
matter of weeks. It is fair to assume that the newcomer has done some
preliminary investigation of the community he is moving his family into
before he actually arrives. Even if he has not, voter registration requirements, commonly ending registration a month before the elections for
valid administrative reasons, have the effect of a minimal durational
residency requirement more in line with the purpose of familiarizing the
newcomer with local issues. The concerned voter does not need an
additional durational residency requirement to cast an intelligent, informed vote.
However, what is done about the unconcerned voter? He is the
basis of the second objection to the familiarization justification. For him,
the durational residency requirement is ineffective. Regardless of how long
he lives in the community, he may never become acquainted with issues
or candidates beyond the party label. The key variable in voter information is voter concern, not length of residency. Any attempt to increase
voter awareness of issues through residency requirements beyond those
already imposed in registration is both unnecessary and ineffective.
A third objection to this rationale is that the state, whatever
argument it may make, is not really concerned with assuring that voters
are knowledgeable on local issues. Consider, for example, the use of
absentee ballots. It is inconsistent to argue that a compelling need ta
assure knowledge of local issues and conditions justifies denying the
vote to a resident of ten or eleven months, yet at the same time extend the
60. Christopher v. Mitchell, 39 U.S.L.W. 2196 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 1970).

61. Id. a 2197:

A states interest in attempting to guarantee that every voter be familiar with
local issues before he votes for President cannot be described as compelling
when measured against the importance of the right to the transient citizen.
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franchise through the use of absentee ballots to servicemen or students
who may not have been in the state for years.62 The entire issue may well
be a smoke screen to provide a colorable state interest for an unnecessary
restriction.
The major justification for durational residency requirements, however, is fraud. Preventing election fraud is a vital state concern. Colonizing, the practice of importing large numbers of non-residents to vote in
an election, is a major target of durational residency requirements. In
the period from 1868 to 1871, "Boss" Tweed's machine in New York
City was so effective at colonizing that votes cast exceeded the total
voting population by eight per cent. 3 While the politicians of today may
be more subtle than the Tweed Ring, there is still sufficient evidence of
election fraud to pose a major problem. However, it is one thing to say
a state has a compelling interest in preventing election fraud, but it is
quite another to say that there is a compelling interest in using durational
residency requirements for that purpose.
There are three objections to the conclusion that prevention of
fraud justifies durational residency requirements. The first objection is
that durational residency requirements are unnecessary to identify voters
as bona fide residents. The Voting Rights Act of 1970 recites the
Congressional finding that a durational residency requirement "does not
bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling state interest in the
conduct of Presidential elections." 4 In the context of knowledge of local
issues, the reference to presidential elections minimizes the applicability
of the principal to state and local elections, but this limitation is less clear
when the issue is fraud. While the relation is not exact, there is a
similarity in the problem of preventing fraud in presidential or state and
local elections. It appears, moreover, that states have been able to
successfully determine bona fide residence for purposes other than voting.6" Ascertainment of bona fide residence and prevention of fraud
62. See MacLeod & Wilberding, State Voting Residency Requirements and Civil
Rights, 38 GEO. WASH. L. R~v. 93 (1969) :
The anomalous situation which denies the vote to "new" residents of ten or
eleven months while extending it fully in the form of absentee ballots to
servicemen-no matter how long they have been away-belies the utter fully of
the rationale used to support this second "purpose."

Id. at 115.
63. Note, Federal Elections-The Disfranchising Residency Requirement, 1962 U.
ILL. L.F. 101, 103 n. 17.
64. Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 202(a) (b) (June 22, 1970), amending, 42 U.S.C.A. §

1971 (Supp. V 1965-70).
65. [I]n other areas where identification is needed states have been able to
"winnow successfully from the ranks . . .those whose residence in the State is
bona fide." In addition to divorce acions, states experience little difficulty in
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need not rely on durational residency requirements.
A second objection to the fraud justification is that durational
residency requirements are ineffective as a tool to combat fraud. The
state commonly performs no investigation to determine duration of
residency. The prospective voter merely swears that he has lived in the
precinct and state for the proscribed period. This requirement adds little
protection from deliberate fraud. It is just as easy to lie about how long
you have been a resident as to lie about presently being a resident."
Although it may be marginally easier to determine duration of residency
than bona fide residency by investigation, it is impractical enough to do
either that the additional restriction would be an ineffective protection
against fraud.
The third argument is that adopted by the court in Blurnstein. There
are less restrictive alternatives than durational residency requirements
which are as effective in combating fraud. In Shapiro, the fraud argument
was rejected on this basis. Even though it was admitted that safeguarding
against fraud was a compelling state interest, the court pointed out that
"less drastic means are available and are employed, to minimize that
hazard." 6 Specifically, the Shapiro court referred to the "distinct and
independent" 6 requirement that a welfare recipient be a bona fide
resident, as well as meet the one-year waiting period requirement. The
court found that the bona fide resident requirement was a complete and
less onerous alternative to durational residency as a measure to prevent
fraud. The less onerous alternative principal is in accord with wellrecognized equal protection standards.6 9
Even if the less onerous alternative were to require greater state
effort to administer, this would not excuse the state from its obligation
to adopt such a measure: "States may not casually deprive a class of
identifying their residents for taxation purposes. A new resident is certainly
not granted a one year grace period before being compelled to pay taxes to his
new sovereign.
MacLeod & Wilberding, spra note 62, at 114.
66. The dissent in Hall v. Beals stated:
the nonresident seeking to vote, can as easily swear that he has been a resident
for a certain time, as he could falsely swear that he is presently a resident.
The requirement of the additional element to be sworn-the duration of residencyadds no discernible protection against "dual voting" or "colonization" by voters
willing to lie.
396 U.S. at 54 (dissenting opinion of Marshall).

67. 394 U.S. at 637.
68. 394 U.S. at 636.
69. "The Court may also apply the principal of the least onerous alternative and
hold a rational classification to be impermissible because . . . less harsh means are
available." Karst & Horowitz, Reitnan v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantkve Equal
Protection,1967 Sue. CT. REv. 39, 58.
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individuals of the vote because of some remote administrative benefit
to the state. ' 70 Consequently, the state may not use the durational
residency requirement as a standard of determining bona fide residence.
With a less restrictive but equally effective alternative available at only
a remote administrative cost, the Blumstein court was justified in finding
that the durational residency requirement was "not necessary" to promote
a "compelling state interest."
III.

CONCLUSION

The Blumstein court was justified in requiring the state to show that
its durational residency requirements were necessary to meet a compelling
state interest. Election restrictions fall under either of the two exceptions
to the general "rational relation" rule for judging legislative classifications for purposes of fourteenth amendment equal protection. The court
correctly dismissed the state's fraud justification as being unnecessary in
light of available alternatives for dealing with election fraud. For prevention of fraud as well as for other justifications the requirements
are both unnecessary and ineffective.
IV.

RELATED CASES

Two related cases recently decided by lower courts may indicate a
judicial current opposing virtually all durational residency requirements.
Using language similar to Shapiro, a three-judge United States District
Court in North Carolina held North Carolina's one-year residency
requirement for taking the bar examination unconstitutional. 7' The court
based its holding on a right to travel argument. Apparently wary of
relying too heavily on the Shapiro precedent, the court specifically found
that the state's interests in such a requirement did not measure up even
to the "rational basis" test of validity. The court rejected the justification
of allowing the lawyer time to learn local customs as being irrelevant to
the competent practice of law. A second argument, that the requirement
permitted observation by the community of the lawyer's moral standards,
was rejected as well. The durational residency requirement was determined to be ineffective in allowing a valid assessment of moral character.
Finally, the court rejected the argument that the requirement assures that
the lawyer intends permanent residency by asserting that one year of
residency means little in today's mobile society.7"
70. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
71. Keenan v. North Carolina Bd. of Law Examiners, 39 U.S.L.W. 2193 (E.D.NC
Oct. 2, 1970).
72.

For more information about Residency Requirements and bar examinations
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A second case came from Hawaii, where a family court held
Hawaii's one-year residency requirement for filing for divorce unconstitutional."3 The right to travel argument was cited as requiring the
state to show a compelling state interest in making its distinctions, but
again the standard was not relied upon. The state claimed as its purpose
the necessity of knowing more about the family situation than would be
possible in the case of new arrivals in order to better help the children of
a foundering marriage. The court rejected this claim as not even meeting
the "rational basis" test, finding that the children of such a marriage are
better served by allowing the court to take jurisdiction as quickly as
possible in order to have an opportunity to take appropriate steps for
their welfare.
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see Note. Residence Requirements After Shapiro v. Thompson, 70 CoLum. L. REv., 150-

52 (1970).
73. Whitehead v. Whitehead, 38 U.S.L.W. 2577
Mar. 30, 1970).
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